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COMMENTARY
German Council on Foreign Relations
War in Nagorno- 
Karabakh
A Two-Track Strategy  
for the EU
After two weeks of heavy fighting, the 
new war between Azerbaijan and Ar-
menia over Nagorno-Karabakh is like-
ly to escalate further. International ac-
tors have so far been unable to broker 
a ceasefire. In this case, the EU, with its 
limited leverage, can add most value by 
leading a response to the inevitable hu-
manitarian catastrophe. EU diplomat-
ic efforts should be led by France and 
Germany, coordinated with other mem-
ber states, and also with Russia, to the 
extent necessary.
The war over the disputed territory of 
Nagorno-Karabakh is one of the most 
serious in decades. It started on Sep-
tember 27, with Azerbaijan making the 
first offensive and will likely continue 
until Azerbaijan re-captures key parts 
of its former territory, which are cur-
rently controlled by Armenia.
Multilateral diplomatic efforts cur-
rently have little chance of achieving 
a ceasefire, since Baku can rely on its 
superior number and quality of forces, 
and on the massive political and mili-
tary support it receives from Turkey.
Nagorno-Karabakh separatists have 
tried to deter Azerbaijan from launch-
ing further attacks by striking Azer-
baijani cities far behind the frontline 
with artillery, but even this has not 
stopped the offensive. With the United 
States of America largely absent, Rus-
sia is the only player with significant 
leverage over both sides. But it too has 
been unable to broker a ceasefire.
T he European Union has l imit-
ed means to inf luence events on 
the ground. And as an actor that re-
lies primarily on soft-power, it can’t 
change hard-power realities far from 
home in the southern Caucasus. While 
Paris and Berlin manage European 
diplomatic efforts, relevant EU insti-
tutions could make the most impact 
by responding to the already grave 
humanitarian crisis.
AZERBAIJAN, ARMENIA,  
AND ANKARA
Unlike previous escalations, which 
have taken place on-and-off since the 
1994 ceasefire, international actors 
have this time been unable to quickly 
stop the fighting and broker a cease-
fire. Instead, political actors are lag-
ging behind military developments. 
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Because of this, the war is likely to 
continue until Azerbaijan reaches a 
result that it is happy with. 
Based on the declarations of Azerbai-
jan’s President Ilham Aliyev and sev-
eral other leaders, the objective is to 
push all Armenian military forces out 
of the occupied territory of Azer-
baijan, which includes not only Na-
gorno-Karabakh itself, but also the 
seven districts adjacent to it, which 
have been largely under Armenian 
control since 1994. While both sides 
are shelling civilian settlements, the 
recent, targeted attacks on the Ar-
menian Gazanchetsots cathedral in 
Karabakh on 8 October indicate that 
Azerbaijan is already conducting full 
unrestricted warfare.
However, it may also be the case that 
– as in the war in 2016 – Baku seeks to 
recapture only some of the adjacent re-
gions. The strategy may be for Azerbai-
jan to recapture particularly Fusuli and 
Jabrail before returning to the negotia-
tion table, on its own terms.
Another difference compared to the 
previous flare-ups is the role Turkey 
has been playing. On the very first day 
of the escalation, Turkey declared its 
support for Azerbaijan’s ambition to 
restore its territorial integrity. 
Ankara is providing Baku with mil-
itar y, log ist ica l and intel l igence 
assistance and has reportedly de-
ployed over 1,000 Syrian militants to 
Azerbaijan. Deployment of foreign 
fighters in the prolonged war over Na-
gorno-Karabakh has never happened 
since 1994, and is another reason why 
international actors need to engage 
with more urgency.
Ankara’s l ikely objectives include 
extending its inf luence over the 
South-Caucasus by making Baku 
more dependent on Turkey than on 
Moscow. Besides, by playing a deci-
sive, policy-shaping role in the Na-
gorno-Karabakh conf lict – not to 
mention its roles in Syria and Libya – 
Ankara may be trying to prove to the 
U.S. and Europe that regional prob-
lems cannot be solved without its in-
put. Baku’s demand to have Turkey 
included in the OSCE Minsk Group, 
which is the designated multilater-
al settlement mechanism of the Na-
gorno-Karabakh conf lict, ref lects 
these ambitions. 
HOW TO STABILIZE THE  
SITUATION
When it comes to the role multilateral 
institutions play in stabilizing the sit-
uation, the Organization for Securi-
ty and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
finds itself hamstrung by its model of 
consensus-based decision-making, 
which prevents it from acting quick-
ly when an armed conflict erupts be-
tween its own member states. 
W hile the idea of deploy ing in-
ternational peacekeepers to Na-
gorno-Karabakh – mandated by the 
United Nations or by the OSCE – reg-
ularly crops up, this would require the 
consent of Azerbaijan, which would 
be difficult to obtain now, when mil-
itary efforts seem to be delivering 
gains. The extensive landmine con-
tamination of the territory also makes 
the idea of a peacekeeping mission 
unrealistic.
In the framework of the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CS-
TO) Armenia can theoretically count 
on the organization’s collective de-
fense guarantee. However, in prac-
tice, this guarantee applies only to 
Armenia’s territory, but not to Arme-
nian-held territories in Azerbaijan, i.e. 
to Nagorno-Karabakh and its adjacent 
districts. 
WHAT ROLE DOES 
RUSSIA PLAY?
Russia is the only power in sight that 
has sufficiently strong leverageover 
both Baku and Yerevan, since the 
United States is preoccupied with its 
upcoming election. Moscow has been 
reluctant to get too deeply engaged 
in the conflict, because its diplomat-
ic efforts are focused on Belarus and 
Ukraine, as well as on relations with 
Europe after the poisoning of Alexei 
Navalny. Since Russia’s direct mili-
tary involvement in the Syrian war, 
Moscow has also valued good rela-
tions with Turkey and doesn’t want to 
rock the boat too much. What’s more, 
Azerbaijan has long been an extreme-
ly lucrative importer of Russian arms.
While Russia has plenty on its plate 
and diplomatic and economic in-
centives to disengage, it has demon-
strated increasingly active diplomacy. 
President Vladimir Putin has spoken 
several times to Armenian Prime Min-
ister Nikol Pashinyan on the phone. 
He called for the cessation of hostil-
ities and condemned the deployment 
of militants from Syria. Moreover, on 
7 October, Putin spoke with Azer-
baijan’s President Ilham Aliyev for 
the first time since the outbreak of 
the conflict and asked him to refrain 
The EU as a whole has limited  
opportunities to contribute to  
settlement of the conflict
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from shelling civilian settlements in 
Nagorno-Karabakh. 
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lav-
rov has also discussed the situation 
both with Yerevan and Baku several 
times, and repeated Putin’s call for re-
turning to the negotiation table. The 
Head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence 
Service (SVR), Sergey Naryshkin stat-
ed that the influx of Islamists posed a 
threat also to Moscow. 
The regular session of the Intergov-
ernmental Council of the Eurasian 
Economic Union is taking place in 
Yerevan on 9 October, and Russian 
Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin is 
also attending. Mishustin’s visit will 
be a good opportunity to discuss the 
issue more in detail, even though the 
conflict is not officially on the meet-
ing agenda.
Besides engaging bilaterally, Russia has 
been actively working together with 
other governments, too. On 5 October 
the second joint declaration of Rus-
sia, the United States, and France was 
issued, calling on both sides to end 
the fighting. In making this declara-
tion, Moscow has successfully demon-
strated that in the post-Soviet region, 
Russia is still a key player and an un-
avoidable partner in addressing certain 
regional security problems. 
WHAT THE EU CAN DO
The EU as a whole has limited oppor-
tunities to contribute to settlement 
of the conf lict. The EU, in fact, has 
very limited leverage over Azerbaijan, 
since Baku has never harbored ambi-
tions of EU accession. It does not in-
tend to adopt the EU’s fundamental 
democratic values, nor does it need fi-
nancial support from the EU due to its 
rich oil reserves. 
The EU’s leverage over Armenia is 
slightly stronger, but Yerevan’s foreign 
policy choices are dominated by its 
membership in the CSTO and the Eur-
asian Economic Union. The EU is not 
part of the OSCE Minsk Group either. 
Only France is.
Germany’s ongoing EU presiden-
cy and the upcoming German chair-
manship of the Council of Europe 
necessitates Berlin’s involvement in 
addressing the conflict. At the mar-
gins of the Globsec 2020 forum in 
Bratislava on October 8, German 
Foreign Minister Heiko Maas held 
bilateral talks with his Turkish coun-
terpart, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, about the 
eastern Mediterranean and the Na-
gorno-Karabakh conf lict. It is im-
portant to note that Berlin has a 
more nuanced relationship with Tur-
key than Paris, leading to consider-
able differences in the assessment of 
the conflict. A more coordinated ap-
proach between these two key mem-
ber states is a precondition for more 
effective EU actions.
This leads to the need for a two-track 
strategy. EU member states should 
conduct active diplomacy in a coordi-
nated way, and not only towards Ba-
ku and Yerevan, but vis-à-vis Turkey 
as well. By acting on the national level, 
problems originating from the lack of 
intra-EU consensus could be bridged. 
It might also make Ankara likely to 
take bilateral diplomacy more seri-
ously and make coordination with the 
U.S. and Russia easier, to the extent it 
is necessary.
Meanwhile, the EU as a whole might 
add most value by addressing the al-
ready grave humanitarian conse-
quences of the crisis. Thousands have 
already left the Nagorno-Karabakh 
region to Armenia, and if the fighting 
continues, more will follow. Civilian 
infrastructure in the Nagorno-Kara-
bakh region has suffered consider-
able damage, and supplies are already 
running out. The EU could offer last-
ing humanitarian assistance or deploy 
a humanitarian mission to Armenia 
and Azerbaijan. The necessary prepa-
rations could be started during the 12 
October Foreign Affairs Council.
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